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Disclosure of Mental Health: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives 
 
Abstract Should people with mental health conditions ‘come out proud’, disclosing 
information about their condition(s)? Recent research highlights how disclosing this 
information can promote empowerment and decrease self-stigma. However, many people 
with mental health conditions still fear that stigmatization and discrimination will follow if 
they disclose information about their condition. This paper shows that their fears reflect 
reality. It shows how recent research on the philosophy and psychology of stereotyping and 
implicit bias, and how mental states are attributed, suggests that they face a serious dilemma. 
If they want to avoid being misperceived, for example, as dangerous or incompetent, then 
both disclosure and non-disclosure bring substantial risks. Disclosure could lead them to be 
misperceived due to stereotyping. Meanwhile, non-disclosure could lead to their mental 
states, dispositions, needs and character being misperceived. There are strategies that can be 
used to reduce the misperception associated with disclosure, i.e. strategies to combat 
stereotyping. However, whether or not these strategies are implemented is often beyond the 
control of people with mental health conditions. So, it shall be argued, societal changes are 
required to ensure that people with mental health conditions can be ‘out and proud’ without 
penalization.  
 
Key words: Mental health conditions, stereotyping, implicit bias, mental state ascription, 
misperception 
 
1. Introduction 
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People with mental health conditions are often required to address the question of whether 
they should disclose information about their mental health. Should they inform their 
employers, colleagues, friends, family, neighbours, etc. that they have a mental health 
condition? Should they be encouraged by others to do so? There has been a recent move to 
promote disclosure as a way to increase the empowerment and decrease the self-stigma of 
people with mental health conditions (see, e.g. Corrigan et al 2010; Corrigan and Rao 2012). 
For instance, a three week intervention, Coming Out Proud, has been devised to inform 
people about the costs and benefits of disclosure, forms of disclosure, and helpful ways to tell 
others about one’s mental health condition (Rusch et al 2014).  
However, many people with mental health conditions continue to fear stigma and 
penalization if they disclose information about their condition. For example, a recent survey 
in the UK found that over fifty percent of the mental health service users surveyed feared 
disclosing their condition because they anticipated stigma and discrimination.i In another 
survey, almost fifty percent of female physicians who were surveyed stated that although 
they thought that they met the criteria for having a mental illness they had not sought 
treatment, in many cases due to fear of stigma (Gold et al 2016). 
Should people with mental health conditions put these fears aside and respond to the 
evidence suggesting that disclosure can reduce self-stigma by letting others know about their 
mental health condition? This paper shows what recent discussions in philosophy can 
contribute to answering this question. It shows how recent philosophical and psychological 
work on stereotyping vindicates those who fear stigmatization. I focus in particular on the 
way that people who have mental health conditions can rightly fear that they will be 
misperceived as a result of others knowing about their mental health condition. In one survey, 
fifty-one percent of service users said that they wanted the message “We are people – see me, 
not the illness” to be conveyed because they believed that they were misperceived as a result 
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of their condition. I show that people with mental health conditions who hold this view are 
vindicated by recent work in the philosophy of stereotyping: if they disclose information 
about their mental health condition they face a substantial risk of being stereotyped and 
consequently misperceived.  
It might seem as if the message of this paper is therefore that people should not 
disclose information about their mental health conditions for fear of stigmatization and being 
misperceived. However, I show that philosophical and psychological research into how 
people ascribe mental states to each other suggests that the choice not to disclose information 
about one’s mental health condition can also lead to misperception. The main goal of the 
paper is therefore to outline the contours of a serious dilemma faced by people with mental 
health conditions: whether or not they disclose information about their mental health, they 
risk being misperceived.ii 
 
2. Disclosure and stereotyping 
 
People with mental health conditions can decide to withhold or disclose information about 
their conditions. There is legislation to protect them from discrimination if they disclose 
information. For example, in the United Kingdom the Equalities Act 2010 disability is a 
protected characteristic and it is stated that “A person (A) discriminates against another (B) 
if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would 
treat others” (13.1). A mental health condition is considered a disability and discrimination is 
prohibited. However, legislation cannot be expected to prevent all forms of stereotyping 
relating to mental health conditions.  
Studies have repeatedly shown that in spite of equality legislation, and some reduction 
to negative attitudes (Crisp 2005; Time to Change 2010), stereotypes remain. A recent UK 
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Office of National Statistics opinions survey of attitudes towards people with schizophrenia, 
depression and anxiety uncovered stereotypes associating members of these groups with 
being a “danger to others”, “unpredictable” and “hard to talk to” (Wood et al 2014). These 
findings replicate earlier studies undertaken by Crisp and colleagues (2000, 2005) and earlier 
work finding that people with mental health conditions are strongly associated with 
dangerousness (Link et al 1999; Phelan et al 2000). People with mental health conditions 
have also been found to be associated with incompetence and character weakness (Corrigan 
and Watson 2002). There is some variety in ways in which different mental health conditions 
are stereotyped. Schizophrenia is especially strongly associated with dangerousness and 
unpredictability (Angermeyer and Matschinger, 2003; Crisp 2000, 2005; Wood et al 2014). 
Meanwhile, people with anxiety and depression are more likely to be treated as blameworthy 
for their condition (Wood et al 2014). People with depression are associated with being lazy 
and not easy to talk to (Thornicroft et al 2007). Further support for the idea that stereotyping 
frequently occurs comes from the personal experiences of people with mental health 
conditions. For example, a series of surveys, conducted over the period 2008-2011 in the 
United Kingdom, found that 87-91% users of mental health services experienced 
discrimination in four or five areas of their life (Corker et al. 2013).iii Discrimination occurs 
due to stereotyping of individuals being manifest in action.  
There is also reason for thinking that many people harbour implicit biases relating to 
mental illness. Implicit biases are “fast, automatic and difficult to control processes that 
encode stereotypes and evaluative content, and influence how we think and behave” (Holroyd 
and Puddifoot forthcoming). Studies have repeatedly found evidence that people with mental 
illnesses are associated more strongly than others with concepts such as dangerous, 
incompetent, threatening, and unpredictable or helplessness (Rusch et al 2011; Teachman et 
al 2006). The finding that people with mental illnesses are associated with negative or 
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unpleasant concepts has been replicated across various populations: the undergraduate 
population, the general population, and people with mental illnesses (Teachman et al 2006); 
medical students with no direct experience of people with mental illness and mental health 
care professionals (Kopera et al 2015); and people of various age groups including young 
children and adolescents and older people (O’Driscoll et al. 2012). Various implicit methods 
have been used to uncover people’s implicit biases.iv Experimental evidence has been 
gathered suggesting that implicit biases relating to mental illness manifest in behaviour. The 
degree of negative implicit bias displayed by mental healthcare professionals has been found 
to predict their certainty that they would help someone with a mental illness (those with high 
levels of negative bias said that they were less certain to help) (Brener et al 2013) and the 
tendency to over-diagnose (those with stronger negative biases were more likely to over-
diagnose) (Peris et al 2008). 
Recently doubts have been raised about the measures used to identify implicit biases, 
the stability of implicit biases, the replicability of studies on implicit bias, and about the 
extent to which implicit biases influence behaviour. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile recognising 
that implicit biases could operate because if they do so they will exacerbate the problems of 
stereotyping by leading to unintentional stereotyping by people who are explicitly egalitarian. 
If people are influenced by implicit bias they may associate people with mental health 
conditions with characteristics due to their social group membership, thereby stereotyping, 
without intending to do so. It is especially important to recognise this possibility as research 
on implicit biases relating to mental illness is well positioned to meet many of the criticisms 
often levelled at implicit bias research: findings demonstrating implicit biases in this domain 
have been replicated across different contexts, using various methodologies, and experiments 
have measured the extent to which implicit bias relating to mental health predicts behaviour.  
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What is important for current purposes, however, is that there exist stereotypes 
relating to mental illness, which may operate explicitly or implicitly, and people who have 
mental health conditions often experience being stereotyped. Legislation aimed at preventing 
people from discriminating cannot be expected to prevent people from applying stereotypes, 
e.g. associating people with mental illness with dangerousness. When a person is perceived 
as belonging to the group of people with a mental health condition, or as having a particular 
mental health condition, a stereotype associated with the group is likely to be triggered. 
Consequently, any particular individual with a mental health condition is highly likely to be 
stereotyped.  
 
3. Stereotyping and misperception 
Not only are people with mental health conditions likely to be stereotyped by others who are 
aware of their condition, they are likely to be misperceived as a result of being stereotyped. 
The philosophical literature on stereotyping has revealed that there are multiple ways that 
stereotyping can lead to the misperception of individuals to whom a stereotype is applied, 
whether it occurs implicitly or explicitly (Puddifoot 2017a, b).  
When people engage in stereotyping, they often perceive information about 
individuals in distorted ways that fit the stereotypes that are applied. They notice evidence 
that is consistent with the stereotype more readily than evidence that is inconsistent with it 
(Rothbart et al 1979; Cohen 1981; Srull et al 1985; Levinson 2007). The stereotype-
consistent evidence is remembered and stereotype-inconsistent evidence is not remembered 
(ibid). People engaging in stereotyping interpret ambiguous evidence in a way that is 
consistent with stereotype rather than how it should be interpreted, i.e. as ambiguous (Duncan 
1976; Devine 1989). They also explain behaviours in terms of stereotypes where a more 
accurate explanation would focus on features of the individual case (Sanbonmatsu et al 
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1994). In addition to this, when stereotypes are activated, and people are viewed through the 
lens of their social group and as members of a minority, it is assumed that they are similar to 
other members of their minority group (Bartsch and Judd 1993). Differences between 
members of the same social group are missed. Meanwhile, members of different social 
groups are assumed to be less similar to each other than they really are (e.g. Tajfel 1981). 
Similarities between members of different social groups are missed.  
  With respect to mental health, these phenomena can manifest in the following ways. 
Evidence about the personal traits or characteristics of someone with a mental health 
condition that is consistent with them fitting a stereotype—e.g. evidence of their 
incompetence in some domain—is likely to be noticed and given attention while evidence 
that challenges the stereotype—e.g. evidence of their competence—is not noticed or attended 
to. Meanwhile, ambiguous behaviours displayed by people with mental health conditions, 
such as lateness or inattention—might be viewed as evidence of stereotypical characteristics 
like having a weak character or being volatile. When an action of this or a similar sort is best 
explained by the personal traits of the individual, or features of their situation, but not by 
their mental health condition, the traits are likely to nonetheless be explained in terms of the 
stereotype: e.g. people with mental illness are like that. Meanwhile, people with mental 
health conditions, because they are viewed through the lens of their membership of the 
group, people with a mental illness, are likely to be assumed to be similar to other previously 
encountered people with mental health conditions and dissimilar to others who do not have a 
mental conditions. Judgements based on these assumptions will not reflect their true 
similarities and dissimilarities to others.  
  In addition to this, people with mental health conditions can be denied the opportunity 
to communicate information about themselves and have uptake of this information from 
people who engage in stereotyping. Where people have mental health conditions, they can be 
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treated as if they are unreliable sources of information about their condition when they are 
actually providing accurate information (Crichton, Carel and Kidd 2016). They can be 
incorrectly assumed to have mental impairments that mean that they lack self-awareness and 
cannot be trusted to convey information. This phenomenon is representative of a larger set of 
phenomena in which people who harbour negative and inaccurate stereotypes can fail to give 
proper credence to the testimony of those to whom they apply a stereotype (Fricker 2007; 
Crichton, Carel and Kidd 2016). Where a person believes that their testimony is not likely to 
receive proper uptake they can choose not to deliver it (Dotson 2011). If this occurs then 
information about individuals who are stereotyped, information that they might convey 
through their testimony to others, will not be accessible to those who stereotype them. For 
example, some information about individual people with mental illness, their personal 
characteristics and abilities, as well as the symptoms of their conditions, is unlikely to be 
accessed and utilised when making judgements. If important and relevant information of this 
sort is not accessed, judgements about people with mental illness are less likely to be accurate 
or fitting with the evidence that is available.  
If a person fears being misperceived due to their mental health condition, their fears 
sadly reflect reality. As things currently stand, they are likely to be stereotyped due to their 
mental health condition, and are therefore likely to be misperceived by the person engaging 
in the stereotyping, who will either fail to access or properly respond to relevant information 
about them. Disclosure of a mental health condition therefore brings the associated risk of 
being misperceived, e.g. as dangerous, incompetent, and just like other people with mental 
health conditions.  
 
4. Non-disclosure and misperception: Information and Understanding 
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Should people with mental health conditions avoid disclosing information about their 
condition to avoid the stereotyping and misperception described in sections 2 and 3? The 
psychological and philosophical literature on stereotyping points in this direction. However, 
within the philosophy of mind and philosophy of mental disorder, there are other arguments 
that point in the opposite direction, suggesting that non-disclosure of information about a 
mental health condition can lead to misperception. This is because someone who lacks 
information about another person’s mental health can consequently fail to properly ascribe 
mental states and dispositions to that person. 
For instance, in the philosophical literature on psychiatric delusions, it has been 
argued that it is possible to understand, predict and explain the behaviour of people with 
mental health conditions but only if they are viewed as having unusual thoughts. The 
following example illustrates this point:  
 
Lizard Man: a 22-year-old Rastafarian man of Jamaican parents was admitted from 
casualty, having superficially stabbed himself with broken glass. He had become 
acutely distressed over the past 2–3 days, feeling anxious and depressed and believing 
that his movements were [being] watched by TV cameras, and signals about him were 
[being] passed between shopkeepers and that people in shops were talking about him. 
He was particularly distressed by the scaly appearance of his skin, which he believed 
was caused by a lizard growing inside his body, the lizard’s skin being evident on his 
arms and legs. He gave the growth of the lizard inside his chest as the reason for 
stabbing himself. He related this to an incident 10 years before when, in Jamaica, a 
lizard had run across his face. He believed that the lizard had ‘‘left its mark’’ and that 
a curse then had produced his skin lesions. (Campbell 2009, p. 143, Reimer 2011, p. 
662)  
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Marga Reimer (2011), rightly it seems, claims that it is possible to understand the mental 
states of the man described in this example. It is even possible to explain why he behaves the 
way that he does. We could predict related behaviours that he is likely to engage in. 
However, we are only able to do each of these things because we ascribe to him a bizarre 
thought: that there is a lizard underneath his skin. We need to focus on an aspect of Lizard 
Man’s thought that is so bizarre that the possession of the thought provides a strong 
indication of mental illness. Without noticing this aspect of his thought, we would not be able 
to make sense of his actions or the claims that he makes. We would misperceive and 
misunderstand his behaviour. But on noticing this aspect of his thought it is natural to ascribe 
him with a mental health condition, i.e. having a psychiatric delusion. It is therefore not 
possible to avoid misperceiving him and to instead understand what he is thinking without 
being aware of his mental health condition.  
The Lizard Man example is extreme. Many mental health conditions do not include 
thoughts with such bizarre content. Take, for example, depression, low mood or borderline 
personality disorder. None of these conditions commonly involves bizarre thoughts. 
Nonetheless a brief survey of the dominant philosophical accounts of how mental states and 
dispositions are ascribed shows that the general point about the Lizard Man case applies to 
these other mental health conditions. In order for people to properly understand certain 
aspects of what a person is thinking and how they are disposed to think and behave, and in 
order to accurately predict and explain certain aspects of their behaviour, it will often be 
necessary to be aware that they have a mental health condition.  
Let us begin by considering simulation theory. According to this view, when we 
ascribe mental states to others we project ourselves into their situation (see, e.g. Gordon 
1986; Heal 1986; Goldman 1989).  We simulate what we would think and feel if we occupied 
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their situation, making adjustments for any ways that we think that their thoughts are likely to 
differ from ours. If a person has a mental health condition then they are likely to think and 
feel in ways that are significantly different to our own. This means that a significant 
adjustment will need to be made. But the adjustment is only likely to properly reflect the 
difference between one’s own situation and the situation of a person with a mental health 
condition if one is aware of the condition.  
On another account of how mental states and dispositions are ascribed, theory theory, 
mental state ascription involves the application of a tacit theory (e.g Gopnik & Meltzoff 
1997; Gopnik et al., 1999). The laws of the theory relate to the situation in which an 
individual is located, their behaviour as it is found in that situation, and the mental states that 
underwrite the behaviour. People make inferences from the presence of certain behaviours to 
the presence of particular mental states by applying the theory. In order for the application of 
a theory to yield accurate judgements about a person’s mental states and dispositions when 
they have a mental health condition it can be necessary to notice that the tacit theory that 
successfully predicts many people’s mental states and dispositions needs to be adjusted. This 
is because a person with a mental health condition has aspects of their mental life that differ 
significantly from most other people’s. With respect to those aspects of their mental life, their 
behaviours will relate differently than other people’s to their mental states and situation. For 
example, the belief that a lizard ran over one’s arm and the presence of scaly skin would not 
usually lead to the behaviour displayed by Lizard Man. A tacit theory that ascribes mental 
states to people who do not have mental health conditions would be unable to account for 
Lizard Man’s behaviour. In order for Lizard Man’s thoughts to be properly understood some 
adjustment needs to be made to the tacit theory about how mental states, behaviours and 
situations usually interrelate, to reflect his mental health condition.  
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Another account of how mental states and dispositions are ascribed is intentional 
systems theory. According to this theory, the ascription of mental states and dispositions is 
achieved by adopting the intentional stance, viewing others as having beliefs, desires, 
intentions, and so on (Dennett 1971; 1987). The intentional stance involves applying 
a principle of charity to others, assuming that they display rational characteristics; that they 
believe what they should; have largely true beliefs; and are largely correct in the inferences, 
expectations and the decisions that they make. People who make these assumptions about 
people with mental health conditions often draw false conclusions about what they think. In 
order for accurate judgments to be made about people with mental health conditions it will 
sometimes be necessary to take their condition into consideration, consequently suspending 
one’s commitment to some or all of the principle of charity, the rationality assumption, and 
the assumption that they are likely to be displaying true beliefs and correct inferences. 
Therefore, adjustments will need to be made to the principles underlying most mental state 
ascription to ensure that the mental states and dispositions of people with mental health 
conditions are properly understood. 
According to a final account of how people ascribe mental states and dispositions to 
others our capacity for understanding mental states is underwritten by our capacity for 
creating and applying narratives (Hutto 2008; Gallagher & Hutto 2008). From early 
childhood, we are exposed to narratives by our caregivers who guide us through the reading 
of stories such as fairy-tales. In these narratives, characters are introduced within a specific 
set of circumstances and they act for reasons. Our early exposure to these narratives provides 
a sense of what is acceptable in certain types of circumstances, what types of activities are 
interesting and worth noting, what accounts for certain types of action, and what constitutes a 
good reason for acting. The narratives provide a grasp of cultural norms and likely reasons 
for action. Then, throughout adulthood, we continue to create and apply narratives to 
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understand the reasons why individuals act in the ways that they do. On this account of the 
ascription of mental states and dispositions, it will be necessary to take a person’s mental 
health condition into consideration because the pathological mental states and dispositions of 
people with mental health conditions will often not fit standard narrative structures. They will 
violate cultural norms and expectations. To properly understand the mental states and 
dispositions of those with mental health conditions it will therefore be necessary to factor in 
how they are likely to deviate from cultural norms and expectations and develop narratives 
that reflect this.  
It is important to note that not all aspects of the mental life of a person with a mental 
health condition will always be significantly different to the average, deviate from norms of 
rationality, or violate cultural and social norms and expectations. But there will often be 
aspects of the mental lives of people with mental health conditions that have these features—
the aspects that relate to the mental health conditions. For example, a person with depression 
might make an unusually negative assessment of their prospects while otherwise having 
many mental states and dispositions that are like that of the average non-depressed person. It 
is the assessment of their prospects that means that they have mental states that deviate 
significantly from the average and it is the same feature of their mental life that means that 
they are depressed. It is therefore with respect to the aspects of their mental life that are 
constitutive of their mental health condition, and those closely related, that people risk being 
misunderstood if they do not disclose information about their mental health. 
In sum, then, proper understanding of the mental states and dispositions of people 
with mental health conditions often requires knowledge about their conditions. The Lizard 
Man illustrates this point. Each of the dominant accounts of the way that mental states and 
dispositions are ascribed suggests this to be the case. This means that if a person chooses not 
to disclose information about their mental health condition, they risk being misperceived by 
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people who can consequently lack the information required to develop a proper 
understanding of their mental states and dispositions.   
 
5. Non-disclosure and misperception: What happens in the absence of the information? 
 
Section 3 shows how it can be valuable for a person to disclose information about their 
mental health: disclosure provides other people with the information required for 
understanding of their mental states, dispositions and behaviours. This section explores in 
more depth what happens if they do not disclose the information. What are the specific risks 
associated with being misperceived due to non-disclosure? This section focuses on two risks, 
each of which could have a significant impact upon the wellbeing and life outcomes of 
people with mental health conditions.v  
First of all, the person who does not disclose information about their mental health 
condition takes the risk that the needs associated with their mental health condition are not 
properly understood. Take, for example, a student with anxiety. She dreads public speaking, 
and therefore misses class when she is aware that she has to orally present her work. If her 
teacher is not aware of her mental health condition then her absence could be misperceived as 
indicating that she is lazy, disorganised or lacking commitment to her education. If the 
teacher misperceives the student in any of these ways then the needs of the student will not be 
recognised. However, if the teacher has information about the student’s mental health 
condition, special measures could be put in place to support her. For instance, she could be 
allowed to work as a part of a group, contributing to the research for the presentation without 
being required to engage in public speaking. There will be many similar cases in which a 
person has additional needs as a result of their mental health condition. If people are not 
aware of the condition then their situation will be misperceived and they will not be provided 
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with the necessary support. And it could have a significant negative impact upon their life 
outcomes, e.g. leading them to underperform in their education or working life.   
Second of all, a person with a mental health condition could be misperceived as 
having a poor character because of a lack of understanding of their condition. A case that 
illustrates this point is that of personality disorder. The following is the definition of 
personality disorder provided by the ICD-10:  
  
These types of condition comprise deeply ingrained and enduring behaviour patterns, 
manifesting themselves as inflexible responses to a broad range of personal and social 
situations. They represent either extreme or significant deviations from the way the 
average individual in a given culture perceives, thinks, feels, and particularly relates 
to others. Such behaviour patterns tend to be stable and to encompass multiple 
domains of behaviour and psychological functioning. They are frequently, but not 
always, associated with various degrees of subjective distress and problems in social 
functioning and performance.  
  
If a person displays ingrained and inflexible responses to personal and social situations, 
which are extreme or significant deviations from the way that the average person behaves in a 
culture, their behaviour could easily be misperceived. The behaviour can be viewed as 
indicative of a poor character or ‘badness’. Because a person with personality disorder 
deviates from social norms it could be tempting to describe them as a troublemaker. If, on the 
other hand, a person discloses that they have a mental health condition, they provide other 
people with the opportunity to become informed about their condition, and to understand that 
they are not bad and instead their behaviour is the result of a mental health issue.  
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Those that do not disclose information about their mental health condition therefore 
risk being having their needs neglected and being viewed as having a poor character. If they 
are concerned about being misperceived, then there is good reason for them to be tempted not 
to disclose information about their condition because doing so reduces the chance of them 
being misperceived as a result of being stereotyped. However, if they choose not to disclose 
information about their condition, they risk other forms of misperception. They therefore face 
a serious dilemma about whether to disclose information about their condition if they want to 
avoid being misperceived.  
 
6. Objections and replies 
 
It will be worthwhile considering two potential objections that could be raised at this point. 
Responding to them will provide the opportunity to provide clarification about the nature of 
the dilemma faced by people with mental health conditions. 
 
6.1. Lack of insight 
 
6.1.1.Objection 
The first objection is that people with mental health conditions often lack insight into their 
condition. Insight is defined as awareness that one has a mental illness, ability to label 
symptoms of the condition as pathological, and awareness of the effectiveness of and 
compliance to treatment for one’s condition (David 1990). Where people lack insight into 
their condition, they can lack the ability to disclose information about their condition and 
would not be likely to face the dilemma presented in this paper.  
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6.1.2. Reply 
It is important to acknowledge that mental health conditions do sometimes involve a lack of 
insight and that this can provide an impediment to the ability to disclose information about 
the condition. Where people completely lack awareness that they have a condition it is 
inappropriate to say that they face a dilemma about whether to disclose that they have the 
condition. But people with mental health conditions often do have the insight about the nature 
of their conditions required to disclose information about the condition. Therefore, rather 
than showing that people with mental health conditions never face the dilemma outlined in 
sections 1-4, the observation that people sometimes lack insight provides reason to further 
probe the conditions under which people will face the dilemma.  
Recent research suggests that the type of condition that a person has determines the 
likelihood that they have insight into their condition. For example, a higher number of people 
with depressive disorder have insight into their condition than people with schizophrenia (e.g. 
Amador et al 1994; Pini et al 2001; Weiler et al 2000). What this suggests is that whether or 
not one has the insight required to be able to disclose information about one’s condition can 
depend upon the type of condition it is.  
It might be responded at this point that people with delusions, one of the primary 
cases discussed in section 4, will often fall into the group of people with schizophrenia and 
the group of people with a mental health condition who lack insight. This could weaken my 
argument by undermining one of the primary examples used to support it. However, even 
among the group that has been identified as least commonly having insight—those with 
schizophrenia—people who are in remission have a good chance of having insight. Take a 
recent study undertaken by Ramachandran et al. (2016). They measured the insight of 
patients with schizophrenia and bipolar mood disorder in remission, and found that 60% of 
patients with schizophrenia were aware of their condition while 100% of patients with bipolar 
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mood disorder were aware of their condition. Among the group with schizophrenia, 40% 
lacked insight into their having the condition, but they were in the minority. These results 
suggest that people with some mental health conditions, such as bipolar disorder, are highly 
likely to have the insight about their condition required to face the dilemma outlined in this 
paper when they are in remission. But the results also suggest that many people with 
conditions often closely associated with a lack of insight, such as schizophrenia, including 
those with delusions, will also have the required insight when they are in remission. These 
findings suggest that people frequently face a dilemma about whether to disclose information 
about their condition not while they symptoms are most acute (see also Jacoby 2016) but in 
periods when they are less severely ill or in remission. Only then are they likely to have the 
insight required to disclose information about their condition and therefore the ability to 
provide information that will allow others to properly interpret their behaviour if they relapse 
and once again have acute symptoms.    
 The observation that people with mental health conditions can lack insight does not 
therefore undermine the argument in sections 1-4. Instead it draws attention to how the 
likelihood that a person faces the dilemma will depend on factors such as type of mental 
health condition that they have, and whether they are clinically symptomatic or in remission. 
The main aim of the paper is not to show that all but instead that many people with mental 
health conditions face a dilemma about disclosing information about their condition. Further 
work on the conditions under which insight occurs has the potential to reveal the conditions 
under which people with mental health conditions face the dilemma.  
It is also useful to note that when a person lacks insight into their mental health 
condition, others around them can face a dilemma about whether to disclose information 
about the condition. For example, if one’s brother is in acute stage schizophrenia and lacks 
insight into his condition then one can face a dilemma about whether to disclose this 
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information, e.g. to his friends. One can fear that he will be misperceived as a result of the 
stereotyping that might occur if other people being aware of his condition, but if one does not 
disclose the information, other people are mental states and dispositions. The argument 
outlined in section 1-4 captures this dilemma that can be faced, for example, by friends and 
family members, when a person lacks the insight required to disclose information about their 
condition.  
 
6.2. Un-understandable 
 
6.2.1. Objection 
The second objection is that the argument in sections 1-4 is based on the false assumption 
that disclosure of information about a mental health condition will lead others to understand 
the mental states of the person with the condition. Using terminology introduced by Karl 
Jaspers (1913/97), it might be objected that the mental states of people with mental health 
conditions are ununderstandable.  
 
The most profound distinction in psychic life seems to be between that which is 
meaningful and allows empathy and what in its particular way is ununderstandable, 
‘mad’ in the literal sense, schizophrenic psychic life…” (Jaspers 1913/97, 579) 
 
Jaspers concentrated on people with schizophrenia, but his claim could be applied to other 
mental health conditions. For example, it might be thought that people with borderline 
personality disorder are ununderstandable because it is difficult to empathise with them due 
to the anti-social behaviour that they display. It might be objected that if people with mental 
health conditions are ununderstandable then disclosure of information about their condition 
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will not lead to understanding. Therefore, the dilemma outlined in sections 1 to 4 would be 
illusory. On this view, people with mental health conditions concerned with being properly 
understood would not gain from disclosing information about their mental health condition 
because this action would not increase the chance that they would be understood. The choice 
would then be clear: they should not disclose information because disclosure will lead to 
stereotyping and misperception.  
6.2.2. Reply 
There are a number of reasons why this objection does not deal a decisive blow to the claim 
that people with mental health conditions can face the dilemma outlined in sections 1-4. First, 
many mental health conditions are easier to understand than schizophrenia and borderline 
personality disorder. For example, anxiety and depression might be understood by people 
without the conditions as a result of them extrapolating from their own experiences of being 
in tense, high pressure situations, or having low mood. Anxiety and depression do not seem 
to be ununderstandable in the ways that Jaspers identifies. Once again, the central aim of this 
paper is to show that there is a dilemma faced by some and not all people with mental health 
conditions. Therefore, the claim stands as long as there are some people with some mental 
health conditions whose mental states will only be properly understood if they disclose 
information about their condition.  
However, a number of the most compelling cases of people who have mental health 
conditions who are required to disclose their condition for others to understand their mental 
states, e.g. the Lizard man case and borderline personality disorder, are cases in which the 
conditions are strong candidates for being ununderstandable. Should it be accepted that in 
these cases disclosure is futile because other people will never be able to understand the 
person with a mental health condition and their mental states?  
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There is very good reason to remain more optimistic than this. To see why, consider 
how it is possible to distinguish between different types of understanding. As Naomi Eilan 
(2000) argues, on Jaspers’ account, understanding involves empathy or what might be called 
“inside understanding” that involves immersing oneself in another’s point of view. 
Understanding, on this view, involves simulation (ibid.). It is contrast with explanation, 
which involves knowledge of the causal processes through which mental states emerge. 
Much of the intuitive force of Jaspers’ view derives from the plausibility of the claim that 
people struggle to immerse themselves in the mental states of those with schizophrenic 
delusions in the way required to simulate their mental states. However, cases like Lizard Man 
illustrate that it is possible to gain understanding of the mental states of people with 
psychiatric delusions, by understanding the causal relations between mental states, even if it 
is not possible to immerse oneself in their perspectives in order to gain inside understanding 
(ibid.). Even if one cannot imagine what it is like to think that there is a lizard under one’s 
skin one can understand what thoughts and behaviours might arise if one thought this. Cases 
like this indicate that it is possible to understand the mental states of others, including people 
with severe mental disorders like schizophrenia, from the outside even if they are not 
understood from the inside.vi 
It will not always be easy to gain this understanding. Merely knowing that someone 
has, for example, borderline personality disorder will not enable one to understand what they 
are likely to be thinking, the relationships between their mental states, how they are likely to 
behave, etc. without some background knowledge about the condition. However, the 
disclosure of information about one’s condition gives other people (family, friends, 
colleagues, teachers, human resources professionals or other interested parties) the 
opportunity to find out more about the condition and how it affects thoughts and behaviours. 
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After research has been undertaken it will be possible for these others to gain understanding 
from the outside of the mental states and behaviours that are likely to be displayed.  
This understanding that can be derived from the outside, without simulating a 
person’s mental states, is valuable and desirable and can prevent a person being 
misperceived. For instance, if your neighbours are aware that your anti-social behaviour is 
caused by a delusion that makes you paranoid, they might understand why you behave the 
way that you do (e.g. your paranoid thoughts lead you to behave suspiciously and act in ways 
that could be interpreted as rude) and be sympathetic and merciful towards you, even if they 
cannot imagine what it is like to have the mental health condition that you have. You might 
prefer that they could fully empathise with you, understanding from the inside what it is like 
to experience having the condition, but this does not preclude you from valuing the 
understanding that they can provide.  
It remains likely that the mental states of people with mental health conditions 
sometimes cannot be understood either from the outside or from the inside, or their behaviour 
predicted or explained. But even in these cases people could benefit from disclosure of the 
information that they have the condition. If they disclose information other people will be 
able to make allowances for, excuse, or resist attributions of responsibility for certain 
behaviours even if they do not understand why the person with the mental health condition 
thinks and acts precisely as they do.  
Let us suppose, as now seems right, that people often lack the ability to fully immerse 
themselves in the perspective of people with schizophrenia and similar mental health 
conditions but can nonetheless possess the ability to understand from the outside, or make 
allowances for, excuse and resist attributions of responsibility. Even those who have mental 
health conditions with which it is difficult or impossible to empathise, and which would 
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therefore count as ununderstandable on Jaspers’ view, could significantly benefit from 
disclosure. They therefore face the dilemma outlined in sections 1-4. 
 
7. Solving the Dilemma: Involvement of Others 
 
Once it is acknowledged that many people with mental health conditions face the dilemma 
outlined in sections 1 to 4, it is natural to ask what can and should be done. A full solution to 
the dilemma is beyond the scope of the current paper, but this section argues that any 
adequate solution will require societal change as well as actions by individuals other than 
those who have mental health conditions. It will then outline some indicative changes. As it 
will continue to be the case that people with mental health conditions will have aspects of 
their mental lives that will only be properly understood if their condition is known, the 
solution to the dilemma will involving ensuring that they can disclose information about their 
condition without being misperceived due to being stereotyped. 
In light of this, it might seem as if people with mental health issues are equipped to 
respond to the dilemma themselves. They can use the strategy of selective disclosure, only 
disclosing information about their condition to people who they particularly trust (e.g. close 
family members and friends) or need to tell (e.g. employers), to reduce the chance that people 
will stereotype them (Bos et al 2009). But there are significant shortcomings of selective 
disclosure. First, even those people who one particularly trusts may harbour stereotypes or 
implicit biases relating to mental illnesses. Even close family and friends may be influenced 
by stereotypes due to their pervasiveness in society, leading them to misperceive the person 
with the mental health condition. Second, those people who are not told about a person’s 
mental health condition will continue to misperceive them due to their ignorance. Selective 
disclosure is therefore an imperfect and partial solution to the dilemma. 
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Alternatives to selective disclosure are found in the form of psychological strategies 
that can be adopted to change the associations that are made with people with mental health 
conditions. If a person is aware that they are likely to respond in a biased manner towards 
members of a particular group, they can adopt long-range strategies to try to change their 
responses (Holroyd 2012). Long-range strategies are adopted prior to a person being in a 
situation in which they might be biased. For instance, a person might formulate 
implementation intentions or ‘if-then plans’, which have been found to be successful in 
changing the associations that are made with individuals who are encountered (See, e.g. 
Stewart and Payne 2008). For example, a person might form the plan if I see a person with a 
mental health condition then I will think safe.vii Alternatively, one might follow the guidance 
of advocates of contact theory (Pettigrew and Troop 2005; Corrigan et al 2012; Kolodziej and 
Johnson 1996; Pinfold et al 2003), who argue that it is possible to change one’s stereotyping 
of stigmatized and marginalized groups through contact with members of the group. One 
might try to change one’s responses towards a certain social group by ensuring that one has 
regular contact with members of the group, perhaps engaging in a joint task. Other similar 
strategies are available. 
However, it is important to note that the long-range strategies that have just been 
described are first personal; the person whose biases are to be changed must adopt them. This 
means that, unlike selective disclosure, whether or not they are adopted is beyond the control 
of the person with the mental health condition(s). For instance, if Ted has a mental health 
condition, then he might form an implementation intention if I encounter a person with a 
mental health condition then I will think safe. However, Ted’s formation of the 
implementation intention will not prevent other people from stereotyping and consequently 
misperceiving him. Similarly, Ted cannot decide for other people that they will engage in co-
operative activity with people with mental health conditions. Not only do people with mental 
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health conditions face a dilemma with respect to whether or not to disclose information about 
their mental health, they are severely limited in their ability to resolve the dilemma. They are 
highly dependent on others to reduce the extent to which they are misperceived by ensuring 
that strategies are adopted to combat the stereotyping that leads to misperception.  
While this might seem like a pessimistic result, things seem more positive once it is 
recognised that people with mental health conditions are not wholly dependent upon the 
willingness of other individuals to take action to change the associations that they make. 
There are changes that can be made to societal structures to reduce the chance of people with 
mental illnesses being misperceived as a result of stereotyping (see, e.g. Anderson 2010; 
2012). It is possible for organisations and institutions to intervene to control how people 
respond to the information that an individual has a mental health condition, uncoupling 
mental health conditions from negative associations commonly made with them.  
For example, it has been found that although experienced mental health care 
professionals can display the same amount of negative implicit bias as medical students 
(Brener et al 2013; Kopera et al 2015), the amount of contact time spent directly with patients 
in a week predicted the nature of the implicit bias displayed (Dabby et al 2015). This suggests 
that employers of mental health workers could change people’s biases towards those with 
mental health conditions, decoupling mental health conditions from negative stereotypes, by 
enacting a policy that requires mental health workers to meet some minimum requirement for 
the amount of time that they spend each week with service users. In addition to this, in Japan, 
the old word for “schizophrenia” meaning “split-mind” has been replaced by a new word 
meaning “integration-disorder”. Takahasi et al (2009) found that the old term was strongly 
associated by participants with “criminal” versus “victim”, while the new term was less 
strongly associated with “criminal”. These results suggest that strategies such as the re-
naming of mental disorders can be successful at reducing the negative impact of stereotyping. 
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Meanwhile, anti-stigma campaigners can challenge the associations that are made with 
mental health conditions. It has been found that emphasising the common group membership 
(e.g. university attended) between members of different groups (e.g. White vs. Blacks) can 
reduce stereotyping and increase co-operative activity (for a review see Dovidio and Gaertner 
2004). By presenting images of people with mental health conditions that emphasise the 
features that they share with people without mental health conditions, mental health 
campaigners can therefore reduce the misperception of people with mental health conditions 
as dangerous, incompetent, etc.  Each of these approaches is piecemeal but governments can 
enact policies to ensure that initiatives that reduce the negative stereotyping of people with 
mental illnesses are implemented widely.  
There has been a great deal of debate in the recent philosophical literature about 
whether individualistic strategies that focus on human psychology or broader strategies that 
focus on social structures are likely to be most effective at reducing inequalities (Banks and 
Ford 2011; Dixon et al 2012; Haslanger 2015; Huebner 2016, cf. Saul 2013a,b; Madva 2016; 
Madva 2017). The sensible position seems to be that attempts should be made to change both 
individuals’ psychologies and social structures (see, e.g. Madva 2017). Where there are 
strategies that can reduce individuals’ stereotyping responses there is little reason not to 
encourage people to adopt the strategies, but wider structural changes can be necessary to 
ensure that there is wide-ranging equality. For example, the stereotype that people with 
mental illnesses are incompetent might only be successfully challenged across society if 
people with mental illnesses have the opportunity to thrive in the workplace, and the 
contribution that they make is widely recognized. Meanwhile, changing people’s 
psychologies so that they appreciate the need for structural change can be necessary for 
structural measures to be successfully adopted (Madva 2017). I therefore do not mean to 
commit to the idea that either individual psychologies or social structures should be the sole 
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focus of attention for those aiming to reduce the stereotyping of people with mental health 
conditions. However, changes to social structures, such as institutions, organizations and 
languages, provide a means of adjusting the responses of many people all at once, without 
depending on the willingness and motivation of each person. Recognition that these can be 
changed to reduce the negative impacts of stereotyping of people with mental health 
conditions therefore provides some reason for optimism.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Should people with mental health conditions ‘come out proud’, disclosing information about 
their mental health conditions? Should they be encouraged to do so? This survey of relevant 
literature from philosophy and psychology highlights a serious dilemma that many people 
with mental health conditions face with respect to whether or not to disclose the information. 
If they choose to disclose then they risk being stereotyped, even by those who would 
explicitly condemn stereotyping. When they are stereotyped they are likely to be 
misperceived. But if they do not disclose information about their mental health condition then 
other people are likely to fail to understand their mental states and dispositions, e.g. failing to 
identify their needs and sometimes judging them to have a poor character because they 
behave in ways that violate social norms and expectations. People with mental health 
conditions are not able to tackle this problem on their own. The psychological and 
philosophical literatures have identified ways to reduce the bias that people face but the 
person who is likely to be stereotyped cannot enact the methods. Some will only be 
successful if the person who would otherwise engage in stereotyping adopts them. But 
changes to the structures of a society, its organizations, institutions and language, can be 
instrumental in ensuring that stereotype reduction is widespread.  
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others to be biased in their perception of them. The dilemma I identify relates to the biases of other people 
whereas Gendler’s dilemma relates to how one could respond to one’s own biases.  
iii There was some improvement over the period covered by the study (number of people who had experienced 
discrimination was 91% in 2008, 87% in 2009 and 2010, and 88% in 2011), during which the Time for Change 
campaign, which aimed to tackle prejudice and discrimination towards people with mental health issues, was in 
operation. However, the improvement was not statistically significant, nor did it meet the target of reduction of 
experiences of discrimination set for the campaign. (Corker et al. 2013)  
iv The Implicit Association Task (IAT) (Teachman et al. 2006); a lexical priming task (Rusch et al. 2011), and 
the GNAT task (Kopera et al. 2015). 
v This section aims to provide an illustrative rather than a complete list of the misperceptions that can occur. 
vi It is consistent with a number of the views outlined in section 4 that understanding from the outside can occur. 
The application of, and adjustment to, tacit theories, principles of charity and narratives to understand the 
mental states of people with mental health conditions can occur even while one struggles to experience the 
mental states from the inside. Therefore, on many of the dominant accounts of mental state attribution, mental 
states of people with schizophrenic delusions could be ununderstandable from the inside, but could nonetheless 
be understandable, through the application of a theory, principles of charity or narratives. 
On simulation theory, things are more complicated because the simulation of mental states involves empathy. If 
it is not possible to empathise with people with mental health conditions like schizophrenia then understanding 
will be impossible. One might conclude that it is not possible to understand the mental states of people with 
schizophrenia. However, evidence that we can understand the mental states of people like Lizard Man counts 
against this conclusion, suggesting that either Jaspers is incorrect or simulation theory cannot account for the 
full breadth of understanding that people can have of the mental states of others.  
vii Two recent rigorous studies have called into question the effectiveness of long term strategies that have been 
proposed to tackle implicit stereotyping (Lai et al 2014; Lai et al 2018). In the first study is was found that many 
were ineffective in the short term (implementation intentions were effective), and where the strategies were 
effective the efffectiveness was short-lived. These studies provide additional reason for thinking that societal 
changes will be needed to tackle stereotyping, at least the implicit type.  
